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Trying  to  assess  something  as  recent  and  dynamic  as  Occupy  Wall  Street  (OWS) 
presents problems for political analysts.  There is always a danger that by the time one has 
written  in  judgement  the  event-movement  will  have  morphed  into  something  quite 
different.  For this reason alone we need to be careful about offering too definitive a 
judgment on what it represents, about what we think is new in the phenomenon as well as 
what we think presents linkages to the past. On the one hand, OWS is still in the process 
of becoming-something. On the other hand, though, we can see the outline of more or 
less familiar characteristics that might help orientate us towards something that is being 
greeted as a new departure. 
OWS is, it seems, a ‘non-affiliated’, non-programmatic, ‘disorganised’ set of 
protests, interconnected virtually through a variety of social media, drawing attention to 
gross inequalities of wealth and power (‘we are the 99%’).  
The first half of the description should give us the clues we need to trace the 
lineage and ancestry of the initiative. In particular it tells us what OWS is not, namely a 
political  party  or  a  single  issue  social  movement  with  a  neat  hierarchy  and  formal 
structure, or a published manifesto outlining clear aims and objectives that will address 
inequities and injustices.  It’s an odd stance at first glance – to define oneself by what one 
isn’t, as opposed to what one is.  How do we make sense of the gesture? 
Firstly,  history  is  littered  with  disaffiliated,  non-programmatic  groups  who 
wanted to contest inequality in quite general terms.  Groups such as the Ranters and 
Levellers, which sprang up during the English Civil War in 1600s, display many such 
characteristics.    Some  of  them  such  as  Gerrard  Winstanley’s  True  Levellers  even 
occupied space in  ways that resonate with OWS  – that is, through occupation  as a 
political ‘act’ whose intention was to draw attention to inequalities of wealth and income 
(Hill 1975, pp.132-9). Many of the early resistances to the enclosure of the commons, to 
clearance of land for ‘improvement’, and to capitalism more broadly, had this quality to 
them, and not just in Britain.  However, with the emergence of ‘organised’ politics over 
the course of the nineteenth century – in the form of political parties, elections, the ‘free 
press’ and the rest of the paraphernalia of liberal-democracy – direct action as a style of 
politics receded (even if it didn’t disappear entirely).     
Representation thus became paradigmatic of ‘the political’, even when that From Representation to Post-Representation, Tormey
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politics  was  oppositional  or  counter-hegemonic.    Political  parties  came  to  represent 
classes, needs, interests.  Governments represented nations, the People. Representation 
thus consecrated what Hardt and Negri  (2004, p. 241) term a ‘disjunctive synthesis’: the 
creation of aggregate entities through a process of separation – a separation of elites from 
masses, of governors from the governed, of those with power from those without power. 
Politics became bureaucratised, normal, serious, rational. For mainstream politics, this 
meant putting clear water between the wayward emotions of the mob and the wisdom of 
the political class. For counter-hegemonic politics, the party guaranteed that those with 
the ‘correct’ analysis of the ‘line of march’ would keep the ‘trade union’ or reformist 
instincts  of  the  masses  in  check.  Politics  thus  became  the  preserve  of  the  few,  the 
oligarchs. 
Organised politics of this kind dominated the period of social democracy, the 
birth of the welfare state, and of ‘cradle to grave’ entitlements.  Political docility mirrored 
domestic docility, all built on a cosy compact between citizen and state (‘you let us govern 
and we’ll guarantee jobs and prosperity’). Yet just as economic wealth underpinned the 
consolidation of organised politics, so too did economic uncertainty, unrest and crisis fuel 
more grassroots and disorganised forms of politics.  
1968, the year of disorganised revolts and insurrections, is an important way 
marker for change in the nature of the political.  It marked the first step in the decline of 
the representational paradigm, and the re-emergence  of non- or ‘post-representative’ 
political repertoires: direct action, squatting, affinity groups, protests, carnivals. Many of 
these  initiatives  are  sparked  by  a  self-conscious  rejection  of  ‘normal’  or  mainstream 
political processes. They turn their face on parties, elections, and manifestos in favour of 
the immediacy of action, of doing, in the here and now – not saving our energies for some 
scripted ‘crisis of capitalism’.   
The 1970s and 1980s were periods when much of this kind of activity was 
subsumed  within  what  became  known  as  ‘new  social  movements’,  which  included 
movements against war, the nuclear bomb, environmental degradation, race and identity 
discrimination.  They were immediate, direct, and ‘dis’-organised in the sense of not 
being tied to a permanent bureaucracy or set of offices.  Often leaderless, acephelous, 
sometimes  spontaneous,  unruly  and  difficult  to  predict.    In  A  Thousand  Plateaus, 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987, p. 22) famously coined the term ‘rhizomatic’ to describe 
‘subterranean’ underground initiatives of this kind. The rhizome makes us distinguish 
between the liminal and the subliminal, between what ‘expert’ commentary sees above, 
and  what  lurks  beneath  the  surface.    Even  when  ‘nothing  seems  to  be  happening’, 
rhizome-networks  can  be  growing,  developing,  readying  themselves  for  the  next 
opportunity to push through the surface and emerge in unpredictable ways.  Such has 
become  the  pattern  of  post-representative,  disorganised  politics  over  the  past  four 
decades. Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 5 (2012) 
 
 
 
134 
So in the current conjuncture the representative paradigm reigns, just about. 
And  we  still  have  periods  where  nothing  seems  to  be  happening  outside  of  the 
mainstream political process, voting, elections and politicians.  It is at this point when it 
becomes easy for commentary to lament the ‘apathy’ and ‘boredom’ of the young, our 
disengagement from the political process, reluctance to participate etc.  Then, ‘suddenly’, 
there will be an eruption from below, from the subterranean stratum, that reminds us that 
politics is not just about politicians.  Sometimes this kind of politics has an immediate and 
radical impact. The fall of communism in Eastern Europe looked much like this. The 
‘Arab Spring’ has a similar epoch-making aspect to it. Sometimes such politics is easy to 
write off as ‘ineffectual’ or ‘gestural’ as in the Seattle Protests, the protests against the G8, 
Reclaim  the  Streets,  the  World  Social  Forum,  the  Clandestine  Insurrectionary 
Revolutionary  Clown  Army  (CIRCA).  Sometimes  we  can  wait  for  months  or  years 
before knowing what kind of resonance or longer-term impact an initiative will have. 
How much impact has the Zapatista insurrection had, or the Narmada Dam protests, or 
the uprising in Nandigram, or the rise of the Indignados?  Difficult to tell.   
OWS is part of this story.  It offers further evidence that the paradigm of 
representative politics, the politics of political parties, elections and voting is on the wane.  
Participants in OWS proclaim that they not programmatic, that it has no answers, even 
that it is not ‘politically affiliated’.  It contrasts itself with the style and manner of forms of 
representation  that  by  contrast  proclaim  an  analysis,  an  ideology,  a  programme,  an 
organisation representing distinct interests, viewpoints and actors.  OWS challenges this 
paradigm, directly.  It tells us that no form of representative politics, no political party, can 
change the basic coordinates of the liberal-democratic capitalist system. In this horizon 
only a ‘disorganised’ repertoire of direct and immediate political actions enables people 
to be ‘heard’ as opposed to being subsumed within the machinic  meta-mobilism of 
‘normal’ politics. ‘Not in my Name’ is an emblematic expression of this winding back of 
the representative paradigm. It says that I will not be annexed for a larger purpose.  I must 
myself speak to and embody the changes we need in order to address inequality.  
This however is the easy part, for a paradoxical feature of post-representative 
politics  is  that  it  does  not,  as  the  post-  prefix  reminds  us,  escape  the  pragmatics  of 
representation; it brings it into question.  ‘We are the 99%’ is after all a quintessential 
representative claim (‘We are you’, a slogan borrowed from the Zapatistas, is another 
equally direct example).  Here we see also a potential immobilising quality of OWS, one 
that infects all post-representative initiatives.  If it cannot but represent, then how to do 
this without becoming itself a symptom of the politics it so sets its face against – i.e. 
representative politics (Saward 2010)? How does OWS escape the trap of opposing 
representative modes of political  engagement in  a non-representative way?  How to 
escape  the  apparently  futile  and  self-denying  gesture  of  ‘post-representative’ 
representation? 
Not  an  easy  question,  which  is  why,  as  many  commentators  have  argued, From Representation to Post-Representation, Tormey
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immobilism and inefficacy seem at one level built into OWS; this point has even been 
raised by those who are sympathetic to the movement. Think of Slavoj Žižek’s appeal to 
OWS to repeat Lenin’s question: ‘What is to be Done?’ (Žižek 2011). However, this is to 
look at OWS through the lens of those whose logic is itself queried by the OWS initiative 
– those who see politics as a ‘sovereign’ activity in which power is deployed to achieve 
ends in a narrow, instrumental and exclusionary way. How to escape the cul-de-sac?  
Several possibilities present themselves to those who valorise OWS and wish to see it 
develop as a style and form of politics: 
 
1.  Accept  the  very  event-ness  of  the  event-movement.    As  McKenzie  Wark  (2011) 
reminds us, the Situationists urged us to think of politics not in linear terms, but in terms 
of intensities for the participants as well as for the bystander. Those who take part in the 
event  of  OWS  will  never  be  the  same  again:  they  are  changed,  angered,  energised, 
despondent, angry, alienated, joyous.  Those who encounter OWS may display complete 
indifference, or they may be affected.  Somehow. Something might resonate.  They may 
ask themselves a David Byrne type question: ‘How did I get here?’ Mini-micro political 
gestures.  But sometimes large-scale change comes from micro-gestures – the first step on 
a long journey, to paraphrase Gandhi.  
 
2.  Accept the positioning of OWS as one amongst a series of resonances and gestures 
that collectively add up to something more than a gesture-less politics.  As my comments 
above indicate, OWS is one kind of resistance that ‘represents’ in its post-representativity 
the response of those at the margin of wealthy countries of the metropolitan centre; the 
Zapatista insurrection (to take a contrasting example) is another kind of resistance, one 
characteristic of the needs and resources of groups at the global periphery.  They are both 
concerned with the same issue: the monopolisation of power and wealth in the hands of 
the few.  They are both pertinent to the contexts and capacities of people on the ground 
in a particular time and space.  They resonate in different ways, they have different effects, 
but their concerns are very similar.  
 
3. Accept that OWS is a stance of what Hardt and Negri would no doubt label ‘refusal’, as 
opposed to affirmation. This is not to say that it cannot prefigure or point at alternative 
forms of organisation, and being-together. It self-consciously positions itself as a puzzle, as 
a ‘no’ without a ‘yes’.  Lest it be forgotten, refusal can be just as potent a means of change 
as affirmation.  Gandhi saw this, Havel saw it, and so have the millions of campaigners 
who have collectively refused colonial, racist or exclusionary policies and practices, and 
who have therefore become agents delegitimating them.  It might strike us as odd to see 
‘weapons of the weak’ (to mobilise James Scott) being exerted under mature democratic 
conditions (Scott, 1985). We are perhaps unused to the idea of the vote-wielding citizen Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 5 (2012) 
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as ‘weak’, as ‘dispossessed’, and as having to call upon similar tactics to those at the global 
periphery who live in non- or sub-democratic conditions.   
 
But then here is the larger issue. Liberal-democracy is being hollowed out by 
the growth of often-unaccountable global institutions and processes, such as the IMF, the 
World Bank and most recently the bond markets. In this sense, OWS is not just a gesture 
in opposition to representation.  It is a gesture marking the slow yet seemingly inexorable 
collapse of representative democratic governance as a practice and as the paradigmatic 
‘end  of  history’.    Representative  governance  is,  on  the  contrary,  increasingly  seen  as 
complicit in the emptying out of democracy, and in the perpetuation of gross inequalities.  
OWS  is  part  of  the  generalised  revolt  against  representation.    It  asks  to  re-imagine 
democracy as an instrument of the 99% as opposed to something that operates as the 
handmaiden of global capitalism, and the 1%.   
As my comments above indicate, such a gesture should not be seen as in itself 
novel or radically different to the demands of myriad individuals and groups throughout 
modernity.  What is perhaps novel is the globality, the speed, and resonant effects of such 
a gesture. It is now evident that it is not just global financial transactions that travel at the 
speed  of  light,  but  the  righteous  indignation  of  the  many  millions  subject  to  the 
capricious, over-arching power of the plutocrats and those lined up to represent them and 
their interests.  
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